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Abstract 
 
The last three decades have witnessed many electricity industry reform processes in more 
than half of the countries in the world. The reforms have aimed, inter alia, at encouraging 
private investments in electricity infrastructure, enhancing security of electricity supply and 
making power industry operate in line with the requirements of the sustainable development. 
Using an original panel dataset from 55 developed and developing countries covering the 
period from 1975 to 2010, this study aims at finding out to what extent these objectives have 
been materialized so far. Econometric models are used to identify the effects of electricity 
market liberalization on these variables. The research findings suggest that the progress 
toward the electricity market reform is associated with a decline in private investments in the 
electricity industries of developing countries, higher levels of self-sufficiency in electricity 
supply and lower CO2 emissions from electricity generation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The initial push for the creation of power grids was private but it was not long before deeper 
government involvement was evidenced. This occurred with varying degrees across countries, 
especially after World War II [1]. However, whether private or not, electricity industry was 
regarded as a natural monopoly in almost all countries and structured as a vertically integrated 
utility. The rationale for this includes some judgments about the industry. First of all, it was 
believed that in the electricity sector one firm produces output less expensively than if there 
were multiple firms in the market as average costs declined as output increased. It was also 
argued that there exist markets (like electricity market) served by a small number of firms, 
which are nevertheless characterized by competitive equilibrium (and therefore desirable 
welfare outcomes) because of the existence of potential short-term entrants [2]. Besides, 
government ownership of the monopoly (or public regulation) was justified on the grounds 
that the state was the guardian of the public interest and therefore would be the least likely to 
act in an opportunistic manner, as monopolists were likely to do. Moreover, ownership by 
only one firm also helped to ensure the necessary coordination among the different segments 
of the industry (generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply). Furthermore, a 
general assumption was made about the strategic nature of the power industry for economic 
development, which justified both vertical integration and public ownership. In short, pre-
reform structure of the electricity industry was primarily motivated by the existence of natural 
monopoly conditions, externalities, and so-called “public good” characteristics [3]. Therefore, 
historically, electricity industry as a whole was taken to be a natural monopoly, and legal 
monopoly model was adopted assuming that it is the most efficient one. In general, power 
industry was organized and operated under one of two basic structures: as state-owned 
enterprises under government control or as privately owned regulated monopolies [4]. Many 
countries (e.g. most of the European countries) consolidated and nationalized their electricity 
industries into state-owned, legal monopolies while some other countries (e.g. Japan, US, 
Germany, Hong Kong) created private but regulated monopolies. So, over the last century, a 
large number of vertically integrated power companies, whether state or privately owned, 
have emerged under both models around the world, dominating the business. 
 
Starting from 1980s, the rationality behind handling electricity industry as a vertically 
integrated monopoly has been questioned and various reform processes have been put into 
practice in many developed and developing countries of the world [1]. Although the reform 
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steps have been more or less similar in developed and developing countries, the definition of 
success differs between developed and developing countries. In developed countries success 
of the reform depends mainly on how well the reformed electricity markets function; while in 
developing countries success usually means attracting capital from outside the country. 
 
Bacon and Besant-Jones [5] argue that the process of a full reform program consists of the 
following four main stages: (a) formation and approval of a power policy by government that 
provides political commitment needed to sustain the reform process, followed by the 
enactment of legislation necessary for implementing this policy; (b) development of a 
transparent regulatory framework for the electricity market; (c) unbundling of the integrated 
structure of the power supply into generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities 
and establishing a market in which electricity is traded; and (d) divestiture of the state’s 
ownership at least in most of the electricity generation and distribution segments of the 
market. So, key elements of a reform, in the suggested order, are: (i) regulation, (ii) 
restructuring, and (iii) where possible, privatization [6]. However, by no means all countries 
have adopted all of these changes; indeed, in most countries state ownership remains 
dominant, regulation remains largely untested, and competition is still restricted [7]. 
Moreover, in many cases, the initial market design had inherent flaws that only became 
apparent after the passage of some time. In nearly all these cases, initial market reform 
resulted in unintended consequences, which have been addressed in subsequent “reform of the 
reforms” [8]. In some instances, second and third waves of reforms have been initiated to 
address issues overlooked in the initial reform programs.  
 
In almost all reforming countries (whether developed or developing), reforms in power 
markets have aimed at realizing two common objectives: (i) to enhance security of supply and 
(ii) to ensure that electricity industry develops in line with the requirements of sustainable 
development. Another common objective in developing countries (but not necessarily in 
developed ones) has been encouraging private investments in power industry. This paper 
questions the ability of the reforms to deliver these outcomes. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section provides previous literature and presents research 
hypotheses. Section 3 summarizes the methodological framework. Section 4 describes data. 
Following section presents empirical analysis and discusses the results. The final section 
concludes. 
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2. Previous literature and research hypotheses 
 
Table 1 summarizes econometric studies that provide cross-country evidence on the impact of 
electricity market reforms. Econometric studies on very limited number of countries or on 
non-electricity markets are not covered in Table 1.  
 
This study tries to answer following research questions: (i) what is the impact of electricity 
market reforms on private investments in the electricity industries of developing countries? 
(ii) does liberalization contribute to security of supply by increasing reserve margins? (iii) 
what are the possible implications of power market reforms for sustainable development? (iv) 
what are the other factors (apart from reform process) that influence private investments in 
developing countries, electricity reserve margins and impact of electricity generation on 
sustainable development; and how much are they influential relative to reform process? 
 
As mentioned above, one of the key aims of the reform programs in developing countries has 
been reducing the burden of power sector investments on the public sector finance by getting 
private sector to invest in the electricity infrastructure. So, the first hypothesis to be tested in 
this study is: 
 
Hypothesis 1. As countries take more reform steps (that is, as the market moves 
further from monopoly and closer to competition), private investments in power 
industries of developing countries increase. 
 
Among the other basic targets of the electricity market reform initiatives, there has been 
increasing supply security, which is assumed to be materialized by extra electricity generation 
capacity added by private entrepreneurs. Therefore, the second hypothesis is formulated as 
below: 
 
Hypothesis 2. As countries introduce more and more reform steps, security of 
electricity supply increases. 
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Table 1. Previous literature 
 Author Data Result 
Steiner [3] 19 OECD countries for 
the period 1986-1996 
- Electricity market reforms generally resulted in a decline in the industrial price and an increase in the price 
differential between industrial customers and residential customers, indicating that industrial customers benefit 
more from the reform. 
Bacon and Besant-Jones [5]  - Country policy and institutions are positively correlated with reform. 
- Country risk is negatively correlated with reform. 
- Regional effects matter. For instance, Latin American and Caribbean countries are more likely to reform while 
countries in the Middle East and Africa are more likely to take fewer reform steps. 
Ruffin [18] 75 developed and 
developing countries that 
reformed their electricity 
industries during the 
1990s 
- The relation between judicial independence on the one hand, and competition and ownership on the other, is 
ambiguous. 
- Greater distributional conflict is significantly correlated with a higher degree of monopoly. 
- The relation between economic ideology favoring competition and private ownership is generally positive and 
significant.  
- There is a positive relationship between judicial independence and reform scores. 
- Economic ideology shows a positive and mostly significant relation with the reform. 
Henisz et al. [19] 205 countries and 
territories between 1977 
and 1999 
- The domestic adoption of market-oriented reforms is strongly influenced by international pressures of coercion 
and emulation.  
- The coercive effect of multilateral lending is increasing over time, a finding that is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence that multilateral organizations have broadened the scope of the “conditionality” terms specifying market-
oriented reforms imposed on borrowing countries. 
- Countries imitate their trade-related peers, and sporadic support that countries with stronger political check and 
balances are more likely to adopt reforms. 
Hattori and Tsutsui [20] 19 OECD countries for 
1987-1999 period 
- Expanded retail access is likely to lower the industrial price. 
- Unbundling of generation and introduction of a wholesale power market result in higher prices. 
- A large share of private ownership lowers the industrial price. 
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 Author Data Result 
Zhang et al. [7] 25 developing countries 
for the period 1985-2001 
- Establishing an independent regulatory authority and introducing competition before privatization is correlated 
with higher electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in the case of the sequence of competition before 
privatization, improved capital utilization. 
Fiorio et al. [21] Electricity prices and 
survey data on consumer 
satisfaction in the EU-15 
- Privatization does not lead to lower prices, or to increased consumer satisfaction. 
- The progress in the reform process is not systematically associated with lower prices and higher consumer 
satisfaction. 
Zhang et al. [22] 36 developing and 
transitional countries 
over the period 1985-
2003 
- On their own, privatization and regulation do not lead to obvious gains in economic performance, though there are 
some positive interaction effects. 
-  Introducing competition seems to be effective in stimulating performance improvements. 
Mendoza and Pardo [23] Four Latin-American 
countries over the period 
1990 to 2006 
-  Restructuring did not bring about environmental benefits related to a decrease in CO2 emissions because this 
depends on the existence of committed policies, and dedicated institutional and regulatory frameworks. 
-  Power plants based on renewable energy sources decreased their share in installed capacity. 
-  The carbon index defined as CO2 emission by unit of energy for electricity production stayed almost constant for 
all countries with the exception of Colombia, where the index reduced due to increase in hydroelectricity generation 
in the last years. 
Cambini and Rondi [24] A sample of EU energy 
utilities from 1997 to 
2007 
-  Investment rate is higher under incentive regulation than under rate of return regulation. 
-  Data on the regulatory tools (X factor and WACC) show that investment of incentive regulated firms appears 
highly sensitive to the X factor, consistent with efficiency- and profit-seeking motivations. 
-  Electric utilities investment is sensitive to the level and change in the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
-  The positive relationship between private control and investment is not robust to IV estimations, suggesting that 
in Europe regulation may have reduced the differences between private and public firms’ incentives to invest. 
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 Author Data Result 
Gugler et al. [25] 16 European countries 
over the period 1998-
2007 
-  Higher electricity end-user prices in a country subsequently lead to higher investments in the capital stock, i.e. in 
generation, distribution and transmission assets. 
-  There is a trade-off between vertical economies and competition.  
-  Ownership unbundling and forced access to the incumbent transmission grid increase competition but come at the 
cost of lost vertical economies. 
-  Regulation that affects only the market, like the establishment of a wholesale market or free choice of suppliers, 
increases investment activity via spurring competition. 
-  Regulation that adversely affects the incumbent directly, like ownership unbundling, decreases aggregate 
investment spending. 
Nagayama [26] 83 countries for 1985-
2002 period 
-  Independent regulator together with unbundling reduces electricity prices. 
Nagayama [27] 73 countries for 1985-
2003 period 
-  Higher electricity prices are one of the main reasons for governments to adopt liberalization models, a conclusion 
also noted by Joskow [28] in the context of the US. 
-  The liberalization process in the electricity industry does not necessarily decrease electricity prices. Instead, there 
is a propensity for the prices to increase in every market model. 
Nagayama [29] 86 countries between 
1985 and 2006 
-  Reform variables such as the entry of independent power producers (IPPs), unbundling of generation and 
transmission, establishment of regulatory agencies, and the introduction of a wholesale spot market are the driving 
forces of increasing generation capacity, as well as reducing transmission and distribution loss in the respective 
regions. 
-  Different electricity industry reform policies/measures have different impacts on geographically and 
economically diverse countries. 
-  A country’s state of economic development has a different impact on policy effects of reforms. 
-  Coexistent with independent regulatory agencies, reform policy becomes more powerful in realizing sector 
performances. 
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It is also argued that a free market, which is assumed to be an integral part of a free and 
democratic society, takes into account the requirements of sustainable development in every 
section of the economy and power industry is not an exception. Hence, the last hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 3. Electricity market reforms contribute to efforts for sustainable 
development. 
 
To test these three hypotheses, at least three dependent variables and one independent variable 
are needed. Reserve margins and emissions from electricity generation (kg CO2 per kWh) are 
employed as proxies for indicators of supply security and sustainable development, 
respectively. So, private investments in electricity sectors of developing countries, reserve 
margins and emissions from electricity generation constitute the dependent variables. As for 
independent variable, an index of electricity market openness is used to represent the progress 
in electricity market liberalization process. The detailed description of these variables is 
provided in the following sections of the paper. Based on the hypotheses above, a negative 
relationship between the electricity market openness index and emissions from electricity 
generation is expected. Besides, a positive relationship between reform progress on the one 
hand and private investments in developing countries and reserve margins on the other is 
anticipated. 
 
In general, the large electricity consumers are one of the most influential players in any power 
market and industrial consumers are among the largest consumers. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that industry sector, based on its self-interest, may try to have an impact on private 
investments, security of supply and emissions from electricity generation; and as its size gets 
bigger and bigger so does its influence. Also, the dependent variables are directly influenced 
by policy decisions to allow private investments. Therefore, the existence of such a political 
decision is important in the study. Besides, income and electricity consumption levels in a 
country may be important for the dependent variables. Private investors may prefer to invest 
in wealthier countries or in those with higher levels of electricity consumption to recover their 
investments easily. Securing supply security and sustainable development may be more 
difficult if the electricity consumption levels are higher; and easier if the income levels are 
higher. Moreover, European Union (EU) imposes many regulations on its member states and 
they directly influence private investments, security of supply and emissions from electricity 
generation. Furthermore, societies with democratic political institutions tend to encourage a 
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liberal economic system in which private participation in power industry is encouraged; and 
the requirements of supply security and sustainable development are taken into account. 
Finally, population density and share of rural population are two factors that may influence 
the dependent variables too. Investors may have a tendency to invest in densely populated 
urban areas to maximize their revenues (and also profits) and it may be much easier to 
guarantee supply security and sustainable development in these areas because it is easier to 
organize and control electricity market operations in small areas in line with these 
considerations. Taking into account all these concerns, following control variables are 
included in the study: industry value added (as % of GDP), a dummy representing whether 
private investment is allowed, electricity consumption, GDP per capita, another dummy 
representing EU membership, polity score, population density, the share of rural population in 
total population. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To construct a framework for analyzing the impact of the power market reforms on private 
investments in developing countries, security of supply and sustainable development, it is 
necessary to, first, evaluate possible impact of reforms on private investments in developing 
countries, security of supply and sustainable development; second, decide which indicators to 
use in the study and; finally, specify methods to measure them. Let me focus on these tasks 
one by one. 
 
First of all, an accurate study of reform requires an analysis of its impact on the variables 
studied in this study. In many developing countries, one of the most important aims of the 
reforms has been attracting private capital into the power sector. That is, the reforms are 
expected to increase the amount of investments in electricity industry. Therefore, first of all, 
in this study whether reforms really cause private investments in developing countries to go 
up is checked. The reforms are also argued to respond to the requirements of security of 
supply and sustainable development. So, a positive relationship between reforms and security 
of electricity supply and a negative relationship between reforms and CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation is also expected. 
 
Second, to carry out the analysis suggested above, it is needed to decide which indicators to 
use in the study. Since the study focuses on the impact of the power market reforms on private 
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investments in developing countries, security of supply and sustainable development, 
following four main variables are needed: (i) a variable for private investments in the 
electricity industries of developing countries, (ii) another variable measuring security of 
supply, (iii) a variable showing the relationship between reforms and sustainable development 
and (iv) a final variable representing the scale and intensity of the reform. In addition to these 
core variables, a set of control variables that are assumed to be endogenous to reform process 
and explain a portion of the variations in private investments in developing countries, security 
of supply and sustainable development is utilized. However, since the focus in this study is on 
the main variables, a specific type of relationship concerning control variables is neither 
expected nor suggested. 
 
The measurement of the variables constitutes the final challenge in this study. Actually, most 
of the variables in this paper are measured in some form of monetary or physical unit; 
however, the extent and scope of electricity reforms have a qualitative dimension which is not 
measurable in physical units. To overcome this problem, as indicated by Jamasb et al. [9], an 
electricity market openness index constructed using data from international organizations 
such as OECD and EBRD is utilized in this study. The further details of variables used in this 
study are provided in the following section that overviews the data. 
 
To detect the genuine effect of power market reforms on private investments in developing 
countries, security of supply and sustainable development, the effects of market reform should 
be separated from other country specific features. Therefore, the dependent variables are 
specified as a function of (i) electricity market openness index (a comparable cross-country 
reform indicator), (ii) a set of controls1, (iii) country-specific effects (these are assumed to be 
exogenous and to exist independently of reform process, but may explain a portion of the 
variation in private investments in developing countries, security of supply and sustainable 
development) and (iv) other unobserved variables that influence private investments in 
developing countries, security of supply and sustainable development.  
 
                                                 
1 Apart from reform process; private investments, security of supply and sustainable development in a specific 
country and year may be influenced by industry value added, whether private investment is allowed, electricity 
consumption, GDP per capita, whether the country is a member of EU, polity score, population density, rural 
population. In the models, all these variables are included in order to isolate the effect of the reform on private 
investments, security of supply and sustainable development. 
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In the empirical analysis, either a Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) regression is 
used in each model. In FE model, the country-specific effects are assumed to be the fixed 
parameters to be estimated. In RE model, the country-specific effects are treated as stochastic. 
The impact of the reform process on private investments in developing countries, security of 
supply and sustainable development may or may not be country specific as, in some cases, 
international or regional organizations (e.g. EU) impose rules on electricity industries that 
guarantee a minimum level of investment, supply security or emission reduction throughout a 
specific region. Therefore, the choice of regression specification (FE or RE) depends on 
relevant econometric tests, namely Hausman test and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier (BPLM) test. 
 
4. Overview of data 
 
The data set is based on a panel of 55 countries for a period beginning in 1975 and extending 
through 2010. List of countries in the data set is available in Figure 1. Years 1975 and 2010 
represent, respectively, the earliest and the last year for which data are available at the time 
the research is conducted. The countries in the sample are determined by data availability, 
especially by data on electricity market openness index. In the study, the total number of 
maximum observations for each variable is 1,540. Because of the missing observations, the 
panel is unbalanced.  
 
The variables used in the study are private investment in electricity sector, reserve margin, 
emissions from electricity generation, electricity market openness index, industry value added 
as percentage % of GDP, dummy variable representing whether private investment is allowed, 
electricity consumption, GDP per capita, dummy for being an EU member, polity score, 
population density and rural population. All countries in the dataset are divided into two 
groups based on income level (developed and developing countries). The country 
classification in this study is in line with one made by World Bank [10]. A dummy variable 
for each group of country is included into the dataset. 
 
The data on private investment in electricity sector are obtained from World Bank [11] and 
available only for developing countries. Reserve margin is used to measure security of supply. 
It is calculated by dividing the difference between total installed electricity capacity and peak 
load by peak load. Reserve margin represents the amount by which the utility’s total electric 
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power capacity exceeds maximum electric demand. The higher the reserve margin, the more 
secure is a country’s electricity supply. Data on total installed electricity capacity and peak 
load come from IEA [12]. Data on CO2 emissions from electricity generation are taken from 
IEA [13]. 
 
The data on electricity market openness index are constructed using data from Conway and 
Nicolett [14] and EBRD2 [15]. Conway and Nicolett [14] provide an electricity market index 
for 30 OECD countries covering the period from 1975 to 2007. The index ranges from 0 to 6 
where 0 represents the fully open market in which entry barriers, public ownership and 
vertical integration are minimized and a score of 6 is given to a closed market. EBRD [15] 
provides a similar indicator for additional 25 developing countries where EBRD operates for 
the period 1989-2010. The data from EBRD [15] are available on a 1-4 scale. To establish 
uniformity between two data sets, the data from EBRD [15] are converted into 6-0 scale. 
Whole data is transformed once more to get an electricity market openness index where 6 
represents the fully open market and 0 symbolizes a closed market. Figure 1 provides the 
change in electricity market openness index from 1989 to 2007 for the countries in the 
dataset. 
 
The data regarding industry value added as % of GDP and rural population as % of total 
population are taken from World Bank [16]. Dummy variables representing being an EU 
member and whether private investment is allowed are constructed by the author. World Bank 
[16] provides data on population density (people per sq. km of land area), electricity 
consumption (MWh per capita), and GDP per capita (PPP, current thousand int. $). Polity 
score data come from Center for Systemic Peace [17] and measures the degree of political 
democracy in each country and year. This indicator ranges between -10 and +10. It is created 
by Center for Systemic Peace by taking into account the competitiveness of political 
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on 
the chief executive. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
2 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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Figure 1. The change in electricity market openness index from 1989 to 2007 
 
Developed Countries (32)                                                                              Developing Countries (23) 
14 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the models 
Variables (units) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of 
Obser. 
# of 
Countries 
Dependent Variables       
Private investment in electricity sector (current 
million US$) 
104.66 704.33 0 12,412 378 17 
Emissions from electricity generation 
(kg CO2 per kWh) 
0.44 0.32 0.0005 2.59 1,374 54 
Reserve margin 0.49 0.26 -0.0024 1.55 693 29 
Explanatory Variable       
Electricity market openness index (0-6) 1.54 1.61 0 6 1,540 55 
Control Variables       
Industry value added (% of GDP) 32.39 7.43 10.29 69.92 1,415 55 
Dummy, =1 if private investment is allowed 0.35 0.48 0 1 1,540 55 
Electricity consumption 
(MWh per capita) 
5.90 4.99 0.34 36.85 1,450 54 
GDP per capita 
(PPP, current thousand int. $) 
14.34 10.83 0.73 84.41 1,307 55 
Dummy, =1 if EU member 0.30 0.46 0 1 1,540 55 
Polity score (-10,+10) 6.31 6.13 -10 10 1,357 53 
Population density 
(people per sq. km of land area) 
101.26 104.35 1.40 499.96 1,428 55 
Rural population (% of total population) 33.95 14.47 2.66 73.60 1,514 55 
 
5. Empirical analysis and discussion of the results 
 
Throughout the analysis, three groups of models are estimated to explain the impact of power 
market reforms on (i) private investments in power industries of developing countries, (ii) 
security of supply and (iii) sustainable development. Each group includes an overall model 
including all countries, a sub-group for developed countries and another sub-group for 
developing countries. Since the data on private investment in power industry are available 
only for developing countries, in the first group, a model is estimated for developing countries 
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only. So, in total, 7 models3 are estimated. Table 3 provides a summary of estimation results. 
Table 3. Summary of estimation results 
Dependent Variables →  
Explanatory Variables ↓ 
Private investment 
in electricity sector 
(current million US$) 
Reserve margin 
Emissions 
(kg CO2 per kWh) 
Electricity market openness (0-6) All countries - 0.021*** (3.78) -0.009*** (-4.2) 
 Developed countries - 0.01* (1.77) -0.01*** (-4.35) 
 Developing countries -205.289*** (-3.68) 0.046*** (2.75) NS 
Industry value added (% of GDP) All countries - NS NS 
 Developed countries - NS 0.004*** (3.65) 
 Developing countries -24.077*** (-2.88) NS -0.002** (-2.23) 
Dummy, =1 if private investment is allowed All countries - -0.07*** (-4.5) NS 
 Developed countries - -0.072*** (-4.49) 0.028*** (3.89) 
 Developing countries 511.059*** (3.01) -0.169*** (-3.99) NS 
Electricity consumption (MWh per capita) All countries - -0.04*** (-5.56) 0.017*** (5.29) 
 Developed countries - -0.032*** (-4.99) 0.013*** (4.66) 
 Developing countries NS -0.12* (-1.75) 0.049*** (3.4) 
GDP per capita (PPP, current 1000 int. $) All countries - NS -0.004*** (-6.57) 
 Developed countries - 0.005*** (3.56) -0.004*** (-6.13) 
 Developing countries 174.702*** (5.6) NS NS 
Dummy, =1 if EU member All countries - NS 0.022** (2.48) 
 Developed countries - NS 0.025*** (2.58) 
 Developing countries -768.57** (-2.4) NS NS 
Polity score (-10,+10) All countries - 0.019*** (7.54) -0.003*** (-3.6) 
 Developed countries - NS -0.021** (-2.28) 
 Developing countries NS 0.014*** (4.22) -0.005*** (-4.11) 
Population density (people per sq. km) All countries - NS -0.003*** (-7.12) 
 Developed countries - NS -0.004*** (-6.45) 
 Developing countries 22.504* (1.77) -0.012* (-1.98) NS 
Rural population (% of total population) All countries - 0.006* (1.7) -0.006*** (-4.44) 
 Developed countries - 0.012*** (3.3) -0.006*** (-2.71) 
 Developing countries 112.313*** (3.74) -0.02* (-1.98) NS 
Constant All countries - NS 0.904*** (10.36) 
 Developed countries - NS 1.073*** (6.73) 
 Developing countries -6114.218*** (-3.22) 2.275** (2.43) 0.386*** (3.22) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () after coefficients. 
“-”: Not a variable in the models. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
*** Coefficient that is significant at 1% level. 
  ** Coefficient that is significant at 5% level. 
    * Coefficient that is significant at 10% level. 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper, model estimations are carried out and cross-checked by Stata 12 and Eviews 7. 
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In the first model, the empirical findings support the idea that reform process discourages 
investment in developing countries. In Model 1, the sign of the coefficient of electricity 
market openness index is negative and it is significant even at 1% level, meaning that as 
countries move from a monopoly market structure to a competitive one private participation 
in power industry decreases. Based on the results, on average, every one point increase in 6-
point scale openness index results in a decrease of $205 million investment by private sector 
in electricity industries of developing countries. This result may verify the idea that private 
entrepreneurs prefer to invest in developing countries where governments guarantee a certain 
amount of return on their investment rather than in those where they have to operate in a 
competitive market to recover their investment and to make a profit. 
 
The results show a negative correlation between private investments and the size of industry 
sector, meaning that countries with a larger industrial sector are less likely to attract private 
(and usually foreign) investment. This may be an indication that industrial consumers prefer 
guaranteed subsidized prices in a closed market to the possibility of future reduced prices in a 
liberal market. 
 
The results imply that in developing countries where private investment in power industry is 
allowed, investors take this opportunity and invest $511 million on average. Besides, a 
positive relationship is observed between private investments and income level. So, investors 
seem to prefer to invest in wealthier developing countries. 
 
Private investments in developing countries are also positively correlated with population 
density and rural population, meaning that densely populated countries where people prefer to 
live in rural areas attract more private investment. Furthermore, the findings indicate that 
being an EU member discourages private investments. The results show that if a developing 
country is an EU member then this country receives $769 million less investment compared to 
non-member countries.    
 
As for the impact of reforms on security of electricity supply, there is a positive relationship 
between reforms and reserve margins. In the overall model (Model 2.1), it is evident that a 
full liberalization process increases reserve margins by 13%. For instance, on average, if a 
country with a monopoly market structure and a reserve margin of 2% introduces competitive 
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market model in its power industry, the reserve margin in this country is expected to rise to 
15%. This impact is especially huge in developing countries. 
 
A negative relationship between reserve margins and electricity consumption is detected. As 
electricity consumption increases, reserve margins decline. This tendency holds true in both 
developed and developing countries. In addition, reserve margins are positively correlated 
with income level in developed countries and polity score in developing countries. They have 
also a negative correlation with population density in developing countries. As for rural 
population, any increase in the share of rural population seems to raise reserve margins in 
developed countries but reduce them in developing ones. 
 
The study reveals that there is a negative relationship between reform process and CO2 
emissions from electricity generation (Model 3.1). This is especially true for developed 
countries (Model 3.2). For instance, according to the results, a full liberalization process 
decreases emissions from electricity generation by 60 g CO2 per kWh in developed countries. 
However, for developing countries, the coefficient of market openness index is not significant 
at all (Model 3.3). 
 
An increase in the size of the industry sector seems to increase emissions from electricity 
generation in developed countries but decrease them in developing ones.  Also, emissions 
from electricity generation are positively correlated with electricity consumption but 
negatively correlated with polity score. Therefore, more democratic countries with lower 
levels of electricity consumption generate electricity with lower level of emissions. Besides, 
income level, population density and the share of rural population have a negative correlation 
with emissions from electricity generation. This tendency is especially valid for developed 
countries. Surprisingly, being an EU member increases emissions in developed countries. In 
developing countries, there isn’t a specific link between these variables and emissions from 
electricity generation. Finally, country specific features tend to have a high power in 
explaining private investments and security of supply in developing countries, and sustainable 
development in both developed and developing countries.  
 
To sum up, based on the results, Hypothesis 1 is rejected but Hypotheses 2 and 3 are not 
rejected. Overall, the results reveal that the progress toward the electricity market reform is 
associated with less private investments in developing countries, higher levels of self-
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sufficiency in electricity generation and lower CO2 emissions from electricity generation. 
However, although the conclusions verify the idea that electricity market reform process (with 
privatization, liberalization and vertical disintegration) discourages investment, strengthens 
security of supply and contributes to sustainable development; it does not necessarily involve 
a judgment on the overall success of the reform process. The variables focused on in this 
paper are just some of the expectations from the reform and the process should be judged 
based on its overall impact (not only its impact on investments, security of supply and 
sustainable development). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the study, empirical econometric models are constructed to observe the impact of 
electricity market reforms on private investments in developing countries, security of supply 
and sustainable development. Panel data from 55 countries covering the period from 1975 to 
2010 were employed. It is found that liberalization process gives rise to an increase in 
electricity self-sufficiency while it decreases private electricity infrastructure investments in 
developing countries and CO2 emissions from electricity generation. The results suggest that 
liberalization process does not bring about the most important reform target of developing 
countries, namely attracting foreign investment, but it does fulfill some objectives targeted 
mainly by developed countries, that are self-sufficiency in electricity supply and a more 
sustainable development oriented electricity industry. 
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